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Abstract. Some sensations, in addition to guide behavior, serve an extra and even more
important role: as warning or defense mechanisms (e.g. pain, fever). Additionally, intense
sensations are costly from a tness point of view. With only these two biological facts we
show that Nature must design utility functions with regulation mechanisms such as hedonic
adaptation or expectation-based preferences. Even though they are rarely incorporated into
economic models, such mechanisms are widely recognized and documented in many elds
such as neuroscience and psychology. Using such utility functions economists will not only
provide more accurate welfare predictions, but we will also increase the number of behavioral
phenomena that we are able to explain. Finally, we provide as an application a model of the
psychological defenses.
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1. Introduction
Economists usually recognize two meanings of the term "utility." On the one hand we have
Benthams concept of "experienced utility," which refers to the actual feelings of pleasure and
pain (from now on, sensations) that an organism experiences in response to certain stimuli. On
the other hand we have "decision utility," which is inferred from observed choices in Samuelsons
Revealed Action spirit.
Nature designed our sensations not in a random and capricious way, but to guide our behavior.
Yet economists usually claim that decision and experienced utility can be divorced for theoretical
purposes: experienced utility is interesting as a cardinal measure, while decision utility only
matters in an ordinal sense. In the simplest version of the argument, there are innitely many
utility functions that can represent the same preferences.
In order to better understand the relation between experienced and decision utility, Section
2 presents a model of the principal-agent problem between Nature and men as a metaphor for
evolution. Some sensations not only motivate behavior, but also serve as warning or defense
mechanisms (e.g. pain, fever). Additionally, the intensity of sensations can be costly from a
tness point of view. By means of these two simple biological facts we show that experienced
utility must have regulation mechanisms, such as expectation-based preferences.
Thanks to Rafael Di Tella, Daniel Heymann and Nicolas Bottan for useful discussions. The usual disclaimer
applies.
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We want to provide a deeper understanding of hedonic adaptation. We hope it will give sup-
port to the use of adaptive utility functions, such as expectation-based (e.g. income aspiration
theory), cue-based (e.g. consumption habituation theory), etc. Furthermore, we discuss how
such regulation mechanisms may induce innecient choices: psychologists have documented that
people fail to forecast that hedonic states will bounce back to normal levels, even after having
experienced them in the past. As a consquence, people over-invest in activities that have relative
more adaptation.
Hedonic adaptation may come in lots of di¤erent shapes, depending on the particular neu-
rological fundamentals of each problem. Simple economic models, such as Ss investment, can
provide both a good description and testable implications. In Section 3 give an application
to the case of psychological defenses. The results are perfectly consistent with the region-
paradox, one of the leading theories in psychology (Gilbert et al., 2004).
2. The Model
2.1. The genesis of sensations.
The quest for happiness is thought as the main concern for every individual. Nevertheless, we
must bear in mind that happiness has been an evolutionary mean and not an end for mankind:
Nature developed an incentive scheme of prizes and punishments to drive human behavior
towards greater tness. Think of evolution itself as a principal-agent problem where Nature is the
principal and the individual is the agent. Nature chooses preferences for the individual through
her biological design in such a way as to maximize Natures own preferences: reproduction and
survival of the species.
The concept of utility introduced by Bentham (1789) had exactly this spirit: experiences of
pleasure and pain that point out what we ought to and shall do. Nowadays most economists
follow the idea of Revealed Preference, and think of "utility" or "welfare" as something abstract,
disregarding any possible physical correlate. Following Kahneman et al. (1997), we will call them
experienced utility and decision utility, respectively. 1
Every single human action has associated to them a set of reactions taking place in the brain
and the rest of the body designed to carefully guide human behavior: taste, hormone secretion,
emotions, and so on.2 Motivation is one of the biological roles of pleasure and pain in every
living organism (Cabanac, 1971).
The abstraction given by the concept of decision utility is extremely useful for the analysis
of a great number of problems concerning human action. However, studying the link between
decision and experienced utility will increase the number of behavioral phenomena that we are
able to address with the traditional toolbox. Even though economists make a great e¤ort not to
mention it explicitly, in practice the criteria to compare outcomes is either utilitarism or some
1There are other similar denitions of decision and experienced utility, such as Beshears et al. (2008): revealed
preferences and normative preferences.
2Individuals do not need to consciously and rationally maximize pleasure and minimize pain. The optimization
can take place thorough learning or natural selection.
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variation of it. Therefore, a better understanding of the link between decision and experienced
utility will provide more accurate welfare analysis.
For instance, hyperbolic discounting (e.g. Laibson, 1997) is one most popular theories based
on the divorce between decision and experienced utility. It increased the number of phenomenon
economists were able to explain, and by doing so it also made room for new policies and practices:
e.g. how self-control problems importantly inuence savings choices (Angeletos et al., 2001).
Hereafter we dene sensations as normal reactions of the organism to external stimuli. We
will follow everyday examples of stimuli (e.g. eating, getting injured) and sensations (e.g. taste,
pain).3 Despite it might sound awkward, all sensations take place in our brains. Hirayama
et al. (1995) illustrates this perfectly. They stimulate the genitals of completely paralyzed
men to produce erections and even ejaculations. Since their brains never get the message, the
patients nd no satisfaction at all. However, the same patients can experience orgasms by just
stimulating the right pleasure centers of their brains.
The information about the external environment is perceived by the individual through cer-
tain number of sensitivities. Cabanac (1971) notices that some sensitivities give rise to a phenom-
enon of consciousness that attaches a¤ective aspect, described in common language as pleasure
or displeasure. But not all stimuli evoke a¤ective content. For instance, the mere action of seeing
is neither pleasant nor unpleasant by itself, even though the cognitive processing of the images
may carry a¤ective content.4 In what follows we refer to sensations as the e¤ective content of
the sensitive experience.
The rst building block of the model is the fact that some sensations have additional and even
more important roles than guiding behavior: as warning and defense mechanisms. For example,
when you touch the prickle of a rose the motivational role of pain is to provide disincentives to
avoid touching it in the future. On the other hand, the warning role is to draw the attention of
the individual to trigger an immediate response and then avoid being injured any further.5
If Nature wants to guide the behavior of an individual, she has to shape the relative intensity
of his sensations. An individual will follow action A instead of B because the pleasant sensation
triggered by A is relatively more intense than that of action B, regardless of the absolute level of
intensity. On the contrary, if Nature wants to build a warning system, she needs to provide an
individual with intense sensations (in an absolute sense). The stronger the sensation the quicker
the individual will react and therefore the greater the chances of preventing further harm. If
pain was weak then people would fall asleep on snow and die from hypothermia, or they would
frequently die from bleeding because they would not notice that they have a wound.
3Stimuli comprise more complex external inuence, like information. Similarly, as sensations you can think of
complicated mental and hormonal arrangements, such as emotions.
4Similarly, Young (1959) distinguishes between discriminative and a¤ective dimensions of sensations. Cabanac
(1971) noticed that sensitivity is objective while the a¤ective content depends upon the environment (he called
this alliesthesia).
5In both cases Nature wants to make us respond to stimuli, and then there is a motivational role. However, in
the rst case Nature wants to motivate future actions, while in the rst case Nature wants to motivate immediate
action.
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Indeed, Sternbach (1963) found that individuals with a very rare congenital syndrome called
indi¤erence to pain are almost all dead by their mid-thirties. Some hundreds of years ago an
individual with such deciency would not have had any chances of surviving at all, not to mention
during our evolutionary time. The ability of these persons to survive is seriously impaired and
depends on their ability to use other sensory cues of tissue damage. Young children with this
syndrome have among other things mutilated themselves by chewing o¤ their ngers and their
tongues, and by su¤ering severe burns when leaning against stoves or sitting in scalding baths
(e.g. Madonick, 1954).
According to Cabanac et al. (1969), the a­ icted subjects feel all the stimuli applied to them,
including what normal subjects describe as painful. They can detect being burning, pricked or
pinched, but they do not feel such experiences as unpleasant. They have the discriminative part
of the sensation, but not the a¤ective component.6 This clearly illustrates our point: Nature
needed to endow us with strong a¤ective reactions to fulll the warning role.
The idea behind the defense systems is similar. Take fever as an example. Its motivational
role is giving incentives to avoid the kind of actions that led to the fever in the rst place.
However, the most important role of fever is to force the individual to rest. If fever (or any
other defense mechanism) was weak, then people would be able to ignore the message from their
organisms and expose themselves to serious harm.7
In modern times we can live without some defense systems: indeed, we ask doctors for drugs
to ignore the messages pre-programmed by Nature (like vomit or fever), sometimes because with
the modern standards of living it is indeed reasonable to ignore some messages from our body.
However, the lack of defense systems would have been fatal during our evolutionary time, and
even some hundred years ago.
The defense systems are "paternalistic" devices installed in humans and nonhumans to deal
with limited intelligence (Perez Truglia, 2009). It is not surprising that economists have long
ignored the defense roles of sensations, since even some physicians seem to ignore the defense
function for diarrhea, fever, and others: Neese et al. (1994) called this the "Clinicians Illusion."
The second building block of our evolutionary explanation is that the intensity of sensations
is costly in a tness sense. First of all, experiences of intense (positive and negative) feelings
diminish our state of awareness. Among humans this is remarkable for emotions, as anyone who
is coping with grief or a broken heart can tell. For instance, Sapolsky (1999) documented that
intense unhappiness may have important adverse consequences for humans and nonhumans.
If we experienced sensations ten times more intense than an orgasm in response to ordinary
stimuli like eating a berry, we would not be able to focus properly. Not to mention during our
evolutionary time, when it would have made us the perfect prey for any lucky predator.
6This suggests that the discriminative and a¤ective components of the sensitive experience are probably separated
at the neurological level.
7Once again, technically they are both motivational roles. However, in the former Nature wants to motivate
future decisions while in the latter Nature needs to "enforce" an immediate reaction.
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There are further reasons why the intensity of sensations is costly. Sensations involve chemi-
cal reactions (e.g. the release of neurotransmitters), and more intense sensations would simply
imply a waste of energy. But that is only the beggining. Extra activity in the brain produces
heat, and one key goal throughout the brain evolutionary history has been exactly to minimize
heat production.8 Neuroscientists recognized long ago the presence of inhibitory neurotrans-
mitters. For instance, without the GABA inhibition, neurons would send out actions potentials
continuously and would "eventually literally re themselves to death" (LeDoux, 2002).
At rst you may not realize how costly intense sensations can be, simply because Nature did
a great job. Your sensations are not a function of stimuli (e.g. consumption), but a function of
deviations with respect to a benchmark (e.g. consumption aspirations). In this way Nature can
shape incentives in spite of using sensations with "bounded" intensities.
Now we can nally put the pieces together. When designing the systems of pleasure and pain
Nature faces a problem of asymmetric information, as the organism may be exposed to diverse
scenarios (e.g. abundance of scarcity of food, bad or good weather). We will not study the
process of natural selection itself, but we will describe the limiting outcome by means of the
principal-agent problem, as in Samuelson (2004), Becker et al. (2005), Smith et al. (2007) and
Perez Truglia (2009).
Nature must choose a utility function for an individual, U(c), where c 2 C is the consumption
vector for the individual. Such vector comprises all the outcomes achieved by the decisions of
the individuals (x 2 X ), given the characteristics of the environment (z 2 Z ). The function
matching actions and environment to outcomes is: c = f(x; z). The characteristics of the
environment (z) are only known to the individual.9
In the general case U(c) is a vector, where each one of its elements corresponds to a di¤erent
sensation. Indeed, later we will show that the divorce between decision and experienced utility is
embedded in the multi-dimensionality of sensations. Leta start with a one-dimensional example.
The tness function for Nature is given by V (c), which is always of dimension one.10 In what
follows we assume that f() and V () are such that the problem for Nature has a unique global
maxima in X for every possible z 2 Z.
Humans lived as hunter-gatherers for the vast majority of their evolutionary history: the
genus Homo has existed for about 2 million years. Agriculture originated only 10,000 years
ago and has been practiced by the majority of the worlds population for just 3,000 years, a
relatively brief period of time for selection to act (Ehrlich, 2000). If you want to accompany our
model with a story, you should think about our ancestral hunter-gather environment.
8In that sense the microprocessor in your PC is an extremely ine¢ cient computation machines, because it gets
very hot by solving simple problems (Montague, 2006).
9We use a utility function over goods that are only intermediate from a biological viewpoint. The reason why
Nature would do this is not trivial at all. For more details see Robson (2001a, 2001b).
10You can take any monotonically increasing transformation of V (c) and it would still represent the same tness
function.
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For instance, imagine Nature designing a primitive hunter, who can spend di¤erent amounts
of time hunting (x). If he hunted all the time, his organism would eventually collapse. If he
did not hunt at all, he would starve to death. There is an optimal e¤ort on hunting from a
tness point of view, which depends on the characteristics of the environment of that particular
subject: z could represent the abundance of prey or climate conditions.
Some components of c may be the nutrients obtained from the food and the physical harm
caused by hunting. Up to this point, Nature would simply choose U(c) = V (c) (or any monotonic
transformation): since the individual maximizes U(f(x; z)), he would choose exactly the con-
sumption that maximizes tness. You can clearly appreciate the advantage of having rational
individuals: Nature can reach optimal tness despite not observing z.
Suppose now that feeling pain or pleasure is costly. As a consequence, the tness function is:
V (c)  L(U(c)), where the function L() is the shadow cost in tness from experiencing intense
sensations. The function L() is nonnegative (both positive and negative sensations are costly)
and convex: the marginal harm would be practically zero if sensations were mild, but if the
individual was about to pass out from pain, the marginal harm would be rather large.11
There are two consequences from L()s convexity. If it was concave, then Nature would nd
optimal to design a system of "stochastic" sensations (i.e. you would feel almost innitely-
intense pleasure with almost zero probability). Later we will explore the duration of sensations
as another important dimension of the model. If L() was not convex, then Nature would nd
optimal to hard-wire sensations with innitely large intensities but innitely short length.
Facing the tness cost given by L(), Nature would simply pick U(c) = V (c) , where  is an
scalar arbitrarily close to zero.12 Since all the relevant information is ordinal, Nature can avoid
tness costs by simply normalizing the individuals utility function. Nevertheless, that is not
going to be possible when some sensations play a secondary role: the tness of the organism
depends directly on the intensity of sensations with defense roles, and thus weak sensations
would compromise its survival.
To unfold the rest of the argument, rst we need to understand why experienced utility, U(c),
is multidimensional. From the perspective of decision theory, we know that under regularity
conditions preferences can be represented by a one-dimensional utility function. However, the
model assumes that the individual knows his own preferences. The multiplicity of sensations
arises for practical reasons: the individual needs to infer causal links between his decisions and
his sensations.
Suppose there was a one-dimensional experienced utility. If the individual took on two con-
sumptions activities at the same time, he would not be able to distinguish what is the marginal
contribution to the experienced utility from each activity on a separate basis. Or consider activ-
ities with delayed rewards. If the individual took one consumption activity after another, and
11Natures goal may not be to completely neutralize sensations: in term of tness it may be optimal to provide
on average positive or negative amounts of some sensations to the individual. This could be easily modeled by
translating L().
12We could scale V (c) directly.
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some time later perceived that his experienced utility rose, he would not be able to distinguish
which activity triggered the increment in utility. We could continue with an extensive list of
examples of this kind. Experienced utility must be multi-dimensional in order to allow the
individual to "know" his own preferences. This is implicitly embedded in the very denition of
economics goods.
Moreover, we may ask why we seem to have a nite number of sensations. In the rst place,
natural selection needs long periods of time to develop sensations. But even if time is not the
limitation, having additional sensations is costly in terms of tness (because complexity always
is). Additionally, the processing capacity of our brain is limited. For example, our eyes can
transmit between 1.6 and 3 million bits of information per second, thousands of times more
information than our brains can process (Scitovsky 1976).
For the sake of simplicity, consider a bi-dimensional experienced utility. The second element
of decision utility, U2(c), will have a defense/warning role. The rst element, U1(c), will not
have such secondary roles. Since experienced utility is multi-dimensional, there must be a one-
dimensional "hedonic metric" representing preferences over sensations, S(U(c)). In this way
people can make meaningful trade-o¤s between di¤erent sensations. We consider an straight-
forward case: S(U(c)) = U1(c) + U2(c) .13 If the individual maximizes
P
i2I Ui(c) it does not
mean that the utility function is separable in the usual sense, since each Ui(c) can depend on
overlapping subsets of c. The systems of sensations are closely interrelated: marginal pleasure
from sugar may depend (say) on sexual activity, and vice versa. In economic terms, some cross
elasticities implies that di¤erent reward systems are closely related. Theories and evidence from
neuroscience suggest that such interrelations do exist (e.g. Camerer et al., 2005). Notice also
that S(U(c)) (or any monotone transformation) is the decision utility.
We need to model the fact that defense and warning roles depend directly on the intensity
of sensations. The simplest way to do so is by assuming that for such sensations the intensity
is xed in the values required by the warning and defense roles: U2(c) = U
f
2 (c).
14 For example,
if U2(c) is fever or pain then U
f
2 (c) is intense enough such as the individual will be compelled
to rest when sick or injured. As a consequence, in our principal-agent problem Nature can only
choose U1(c).
We can now write the tness function in the following way: V (c)   L(U1(c)).15 Nature will
want to set U1(c) = V (c) Uf2 (c), so that the individual maximizes S(U(c)) = V (c). Note that
we can no longer multiply U1(c) by an arbitrarily small scalar, since it would lead to a very
ine¢ cient allocation of e¤ort.
13Some authors (see Cabanac, 1971) suggested that people may use a metric like the money-metric to make
decisions. We can interpret our hedonic metric as a money-metric where all the prices are one.
14Suppose that when the only concern of Nature is the defense/warning mechanism, the optimal utility function
is ~F (c). In a more general model we would write a second tness cost, increasing in the level of deviations with
respect to such optimal sensations,
F (c)  ~F (c). The case studied here corresponds to the extreme situation
where an innitesimal deviation from ~F (c) is innitely punished, and then Nature will always set F (c) = ~F (c).
However, none of the results change for the more general model.
15We omit L(Uf2 (c)) because we assumed above that U
f
2 (c) is "xed."
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Nature can still avoid some of the tness costs associated to L(): we cannot scale U1(c),
but we can translate it arbitrarily. For instance, dene Uu1 (c) = V (c)   Uf2 (c), and let c^(z) =
argmaxx2X Uu1 (f(x; z)). Set U1(c) in the following way: U1(c) = U
u
1 (c)   Ez [Uu1 (c^(z))] . The
term Ez [Uu1 (c^(z))] is the hedonic benchmark. The individual is still maximizing V (c), yet the
expected value of U1(c) is zero. This implies much less tness costs from L(). Intuitively, the
goal of the benchmark is to center U1() such us on average the sensations are zero. This is the
very essence of the model: regulating the intensity of sensations.
The idea of happiness, health perception and other hedonic states bouncing back to a reference
level is shared among social and natural sciences, and they are widely documented for humans
and non-humans. But there is much less discussion about the actual mechanisms that make the
adjustments happen, and almost no discussion about why the adjustments happen in the rst
place.
Once we answered the second question it is easier to answer the rst. Now we will pin
down some ways in which a reward system may regulate its intensity: hedonic adaptation and
expectation-based preferences. This division coincides with that proposed by Kahneman (2000):
the "hedonic treadmill" of Brickman et al. (1971), based on the notion of adaptation level of
Helson (1964), and the "satisfaction treadmill," which invokes the notion of changing aspiration
levels.
2.2. Hedonic adaptation.
People may adapt to emotional stimulus brought on by life events just like the pupil of the
eye adjust to light changes in the environment. That is to say, sensations may be regulated
automatically, in a homeostatic fashion, hard-wired inside the systems of rewards and punish-
ments themselves.
In terms of the model, Nature can take advantage of time regularities in z to create a better
benchmark.
Consider the simplest case: an individual lives two periods, and z does not change from one
period to another. Nature can set: U1;t=1(c) = Uu1 (c) and U1;t=2(c) = U
u
1 (c)   Uu1 (c1) , where
Uu1 (c1) is the sensation attained in the rst period. Provided the individual does not anticipate
hedonic adaptation, Uu1 (c1) does not modify the maximization problem of the agent in any
period. As a result, the individual maximizes tness but yields exactly zero sensations in the
second period.
If we are making the evolutionary argument for animals it is reasonable to assume no anticipa-
tion. If we focus on humans we should only consider the evolutionary history as hunter-gatherers
during the last couple of million years (as we already mentioned, agriculture has only existed
for the last couple of thousand years). It is very reasonable to assume no anticipation in hunter-
gatherers and previous hominids. After all, not even modern scientists with all the accumulated
knowledge can agree about the existence of hedonic adaptation.
Later we will discuss whether people do or do not anticipate hedonic adaptation in modern
times (the evidence suggests that they do not). In any case, it should be clear that for the
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theory on the genesis of hedonic adaptation we only need the assumption to be true during our
evolutionary history.16
As long as z describes a regular pattern over time, Nature can exploit an adaptive mechanism
to achieve hedonic adaptation. Intuitively, when an individual faces greater consumption Nature
"learns" about the new situation and updates the utility function as to minimize the tness costs
related to the intensity of sensations. If instead of costly sensations you prefer to think about
bounded sensations, the story is the same: Nature translates the utility function to center the
utility function and make the boundaries irrelevant.
There are plenty of studies on hedonic adaptation (see Frederick et al. 1999 for an extensive
review). Just to give some examples, Tyc (1992) did not nd any di¤erences in psychiatric
symptomatology in young patients who had lost limbs to cancer compared with those who had
not. Clark et al. (2008) used fourteen waves of a German panel data and nd evidence of
adaptation to life events such as unemployment, layo¤s, marriage, and divorce. And Bottan et
al. (2009) show that adaptation may take place from one day to the following.
Hedonic adaptation is a homeostatic process, an "inviolable neurological fact of life" (Selig-
man, 2002). The reward system adapts just like the human olfactory system adapts to continuous
stimuli, so that the odor becomes unnoticed.
Unfortunately, in the literature there is plenty of confussion about what is hedonic adaptation
and what is not. For instance, some authors use addiction or relative deprivation almost as
interchangeable with hedonic adaptation. That is very misleading.
It is true that the benchmark does not have to depend directly on past utility. For instance, we
would arrive to the very same conclusions using a consumption benchmark instead: U1;t=2(c) =
Uu1 (c2  c1) Uu1 (0), where c2 is current consumption and c1 is past consumption (and we need
organisms not to anticipate habit formation). However, in models of addiction the marginal
utility and not only the level of utility is usually changing with the cue (Laibson, 2001). As we
saw above, it is only the level of utility that matters for hedonic adaptation.
For example, Jones et al. (1979) gave to a group of people equal doses of heroin every day.
Although the e¤ects were euphoric at the beginning, they decreased over time and by the 19th
day were almost nonexistent. Is in that sense that we see hedonic adaptation. However, there is
a second phenomenon: the marginal utility from heroin goes up, which has nothing to do with
hedonic adaptation.17
Similarly, consumption of other individuals in the group can also be used to form a bench-
mark. If c is the consumption of the individual and cp the mean consumption of her peers, then
U1(c) = U
u
1 (c   cp)   Uu1 (0) can do the trick. Even though relative concerns under some cir-
cumstances can achieve hedonic adaptation, their evolutionary origin responds to very di¤erent
16Because of evolutionary inertia, it could be enough if the assumption was true for earlier hominids and more
ancient points in our evolutionary timeline.
17It is not surprising that addiction is so strongly associated with hedonic adaptation: since marginal utility is
increasing over time, without hedonic adaptation the level of utility would achieve very high levels. When there
is addiction hedonic adaptation is particularly important, but not the other way around.
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reasons (e.g. Samuelson, 2004).
2.3. Expectation-based Preferences.
Lets go back to the static model, but suppose that the individual have can predict z. Denote
c(z) to the consumption that maximizes V (f(x; z)). The individual then knows that he will
achieve c(ze), where ze is given by expectations. We can simply write the utility function
as follows: U1(c) = Uu1 (c)   Uu1 (ze). If ze is accurate, the individual will yield exactly zero
sensations. This is possible only because we were built with serious limitations for self-deception
(or else we would lower our expectations indenitely in order to boost happiness). However,
this strategy has limitations since people can only predict z imperfectly.
In this case the adaptation mechanism is not homeostatic, since it works outside the reward
system itself: it may involve peoples beliefs and perceptions about their environment and
themselves, which may be stored in other regions of the brain.
Expectation-based preferences are very easy to recognize. Imagine that you are on a plane
travelling from point A to point B. Minutes before landing the pilot says that there are serious
technical di¢ culties, that you may hear strange sounds, and that a successful emergency landing
depends on everybody remaining calm. Everything goes exactly as any other normal ight.
However, if I measure how happy you feel after getting o¤ the plane, you would feel probably
much happier than if the pilot had not made the announcement.
Landing does not make you cry of happiness, not even smile, because it is practically always
safe. However, as soon as you learn that the probability of a plane crash is signicant, a
successful landing becomes the largest boost in happiness in months. The reason is that most
of your feelings are not a function of stimulus alone, but they also involve your mental model of
the world and the probabilities that such model assigns to events.
Contrary to economics, the role of expectations in the reward system is part of the mainstream
in neuroscience. Take as an example dopamine, a neurotransmitter present in a wide variety
of animals that fullls a motivational role. Dopamine neurons encode the rewards in electrical
impulses, which are then distributed throughout the brain (for a non-technical introduction see
Montague, 2006). For instance, drugs like amphetamine and cocaine boost happiness in part by
prolonging the inuence of dopamine on target neurons.
Recent physiological work identied the working of dopaminergic neurons in primates. Figure
1, taken from Schultz et al. (1997), shows the typical activity of a dopamine neuron. In the top
panel, the subject receives a drop of appetitive fruit juice (denoted as R), which activates the
dopamine neuron one instant later.
The medium panel shows what happens when subjects are given a conditioned stimulus that
predicts rewards (e.g. ringing a bell). After some learning, the dopamine neuron is activated by
the reward-predicting stimulus (denoted CS), but fails to be activated by the reward itself.
Finally, the bottom panel shows a situation in which the conditioned stimulus is given but
the reward is not. As in the previous situation, the activity of the dopamine neuron increases
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Figure 1. Dopamine activity, taken from Schultz et al. (1997).
with the conditioned stimulus, but then the dopamine depressed exactly at the time when the
reward should have occurred.
Intuitively, bursts of impulse activity mean that the reward is more than expected, a pause
means that the reward is less than expected, and no change means reward is just as expected.
The dopamine system is just one of the many neurological mechanisms that neuroscientists are
beginning to unveil. However, we suspect that the principle above is present in many other
reward systems in the brain.
Life is full of examples of expectation-based preferences. When a small sports team tie agains
a big team, the fans of the small team are happier than the fans of the big team. When Apple
advertises its new laptop, consumers are suddenly less happy with their current computer. And
so on.
We need to understand better the formation of expectations. Once we acomplish that, there
are many applications for expectation-based preferences. For instance, advertising (more than
2% of GDP in the US) works in part by manipulating peoples expectations. Research in some
industries (like the pharmaceutical) may consist on a treadmill of expectations, resulting in both
excessive consumption and excessive R&D investment.
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It is not trivial why Nature may be interested in establishing benchmarks in one way or the
other. For instance, the storage of detailed information on expected consumption may be costly
for the organism, while the information on past sensations may be readily available. Maybe the
organism is less prone to self-deception than anticipating hedonic adaptation, etc. Moreover,
each reward system may combine more than one adaptation process.
2.4. Discussion.
Even though the metaphor for evolution is useful to illustrate the whole idea, the reader
should not think about organisms with and without regulation systems competing with each
other. Hedonic adaptation and expectation-based preferences are not a secondary feature of the
brain, but a deep consequence of its foundations.
Since most of our sensation-centers share the design with the most primitive brains, the reader
should think about the brain as a computation device, and the intensity of sensations as a waste
of energy and a production of heat. Since the upsurge of the rst multi-cellular organisms the
brain has been evolving as an extremely elegant organ: todays supercomputers, such as Blue
Gene, can achieve the same number of operations per second than the brain but consuming as
much power as 1,200 US households, while the brain only consumes 100 watts (as much as a
laptop computer).
We can generalize the results by adding a further sensation without a defense role, U3(c).
The tness cost would not be L(U1(c)+U3(c)). As studies from neuroscience show, there is not
such a thing as a single continuum from good to bad feelings. People can feel sad and happy
at the same time, and an increment of pleasure does not cancel out an equal increment of pain
(Larsen et al., 2001).
It would be straightforward to show that each sensation will have its own regulation mech-
anism (e.g. the gustative pleasure from eating will adapt separately from sexual pleasure).
Besides, there may be extra advantages from regulating sensations. The tness cost may not
only depend on the absolute intensity of each sensation, but also on the "divergence" of sen-
sations: jjU1(c)j   jU3(c)jj . If the individual feels more than one sensation simultaneously,
having divergent sensations would make it di¢ cult for the individual to recognize the weakest
one. When sensations are regulated both U1() and U3() are close to zero, and therefore the
divergence will be close to zero as well.
Even though we keep mentioning the human olfactory and the pupil, those are sensory habit-
uations and then should be interpreted only as metaphors. At this point you should understand
this di¤erence. Sensory habituation is when someone immerses his foot in very cold water and
after a couple of minutes stops feeling pain. Under situations of extreme pain, the body releases
endorphin to block the pain messages coming from the body. This does not mean that U2() is
adapting, because minutes is not the time scale of our model.
Adaptation to U2() would be if someone immerses his foot a couple of minutes every day
for a month and after the 31st day he immerses his foot and he does not feel pain anymore
(notice that this would be fatal from a tness point of view). And the same distinction is true
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for sensations in U1() : if someone consumes three cups of co¤ee and enjoys relatively less the
third cup, that is not adaptation (in a daily consumption model it would be decreasing marginal
utility). We have adaptation if someone consumes a cup of co¤ee every day and the 30th day he
does not feel happier after drinking a co¤ee, although he would feel unhappy about not drinking
one (i.e. because he expects to drink a co¤ee).
We have intentionally omitted the duration of hedonic experiences. Sensations are not instan-
taneous, and our hedonic metric values more lasting and frequent sensations. Some sensations
may yield delayed rewards, which may be smoothed over minutes, days or even months.18
Sensations with secondary roles have restrictions on the length of the hedonic states they
trigger. For instance, an organism should detect right away that it is on re: it would be fatal
if pain was delayed just a matter of seconds. There are also restrictions on sensations that have
no secondary roles, as their timing must allow the individual to easily distinguish a causal link
between stimuli and sensations. In the extreme case, if all sensations were evenly "smoothed"
over the life-cycle, it would be literally impossible to discover our own preferences. We do not
explore this dimension simply because it is not crucial to the main argument of the paper.
Notice that we can replace the idea of rational individuals endowed with preferences by less
sophisticated decision mechanisms (e.g. Perez Truglia, 2009) and our model would be applicable
to even the simplest animals. Adaptation is indeed widely studied in animals. For example,
Yadid et al. (2001) suggests that limbic dopaminergic adaptation is the homeostatic process
behind depression in rats.
Finally, we must refer to Becker and Rayo (2005), who asked the very same question that we
address. Their beautiful model provides a deep understanding of the principal-agent metaphor
between Nature and the living organisms. However, we argue that their model start out with
and assumption that is not valid: they take as given that people cannot perceive small di¤erences
in sensations.
That cannot be taken as an assumption. On the contrary, it is one of the results of our model.
Intuitively, there is an optimal intensity of pain and other defense and warning sensations due
to the secondary roles, Uf2 (c). The remaining sensations are determined as "proportional" to
the former: e.g. U1(c) = V (c)   Uf2 (c). As a consequence, Nature should not spend energy in
developing a sensation-center capable of perceiving di¤erences in sensations that are extremely
small with respect to the intensity of Uf2 (c).
19
18For instance, Diener et al. (1991) argue that the sensations we recognize as happiness is more about frequency
than about intensity.
19It is true that there may be physical and chemical boundaries in the sensation-centers such as it is impossible
to detect extremely weak sensations (e.g. neurotransmitters cannot be the size of a hydrogen atom). In any case,
the evolutionary cost of developing and maintaining accurate sensations is of second order to the discussion. We
saw that sensations with defense and warning roles, Uf2 (c), must be intense in an absolute sense. Nature will then
design them much more intense than the physical and chemical boundaries. Recall that the remaining sensations
are dened with respect to Uf2 (): e.g. U1(c) = V (c)  Uf2 (c), which is then translated to minimize L(). By the
same argument than before, the physical and chemical boundaries are far from binding for sensations in U1()
as well. We can even give a rigorous denition of the "accuracy" of the sensation-center: the individual will not
detect variations in sensations that are extraordinarily small fractions (e.g. 10 10) of the intensity given by a
typical pain.
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Without the right starting point, Becker and Rayo (2005) cannot realize that the multi-
dimensionality of experienced utility is critical to understand the mechanism behind hedonic
adaptation: e.g. a good sensation and a bad sensation cannot cancel each other out. Among
other departures, they assume that experienced utility is always "costly" when exactly the
opposite is true for sensations with defense or warning roles (e.g. a high intensity of pain is
"benecial" from a tness point of view due to warning and defense roles).
2.5. Welfare Implications.
The question is whether people in modern times do or do not anticipate adaptation (recall
that this is not relevant for the evolutionary argument). If adaptation is signi¢ cant but people
do not recognize it, then people will make excessive e¤ort/consumption in the activity/good
that is subject to adaptation. See for example the case of "projection biases" introduced by
Loewenstein et al. (2003).
The evidence suggests that people do not anticipate that their hedonic state will bounce back
to "normal" levels after a bad or good event, even after having experienced such bounces more
than once. For example, Riis et al. (2005) found that hemodialysis patients, after a while, have
a level of happiness similar to that of healthy people, but at rst, when trying to forecast, fail
to anticipate this bounce-back in well-being.
Denote naïve agents (i.e. do not anticipate hedonic adaptation) and sophisticate agents (i.e.
anticipate adaptation) using superscripts n and s, respectively. Since the sensations associated
with working are closely related to the warning and defense mechanisms (e.g. pain, stress), we
will assume that they do not adapt. Since most of the consumption activities trigger sensations
that are not related to secondary roles (e.g. eating, having fun), we will model them as subject
to hedonic adaptation.
The agent chooses e¤ort (lt) and consumption (ct) in every period. Let  denote the discount
factor, and let 0    1= be the parameter that measures hedonic adaptation. A naïve
maximizes his perceived lifetime utility from consumption: U(ct)+ U(ct+1)+
2 U(ct+2)+(:::).
We will focus on the simplest hedonic habituation: for every unit of utility from consumption
this period Nature will "subtract"  units in the next period. Therefore, a sophisticate agent
maximizes: U(ct) +  [U(ct+1)  U(ct)] + (:::), which happens to be the true lifetime utility.
The ow of (dis)utility from working is  P (lt). Assume U() and P () satisfy the Inada
conditions.20 The total utility is simply the utility from consumption plus the (dis)utility from
working. Denote C = fcsg1s=t and L = flsg1s=t . Let BC be the set of consumption and
labor decisions fC;Lg that satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint and such as work e¤ort
and consumption are always non-negative. We assume that BC is such as the solution to the
problem is interior. The problem for type i 2 fn; sg is:
max
fC;Lg2BC
1X
s=t
i U(ct)  P (lt)
20For example, in absence of the Inada conditions a corner solution may appear for the sophisticate if  is high
enough (e.g. he would never work nor consume).
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Where n = 1 (naïve), and s = 1    (sophisticate). Firstly, note that if all sensations
are subject to the same rate of adaptation, then even if people neglected adaptation they would
make e¢ cient choices. Secondly, notice from the First Order Conditions that the condition of
inter-temporal consumption (i.e. Euler equation) is not a¤ected by i.
The only di¤erence between naïve and sophisticate arises in the intra-temporal allocation
between consumption and labor (more generally, between activities subject and not subject to
hedonic adaptation). Because people do not anticipate that a share  of the pleasure from
consumption will bounce back, the naive agent engage in excessive e¤ort and consumption.
It is very di¢ cult to test whether people anticipate hedonic adaptation. After all, not even
modern scientists agree about the existence of hedonic adaptation.21 We provide an explanation
for the puzzle: Nature could have hard-wired us in such a way that it is di¢ cult for us to outsmart
the system (see Appendix 1).
Finally, the same idea is extensible to the case of expectation-based preferences. People
may fail to account (at least partially) that some hedonic states are functions of expectations,
and thus they will over-engage in such activities. The naïve agent chasing higher and higher
expectations may end up less happy than a sophisticate agent who decided to settle for a lower
standard of living.
2.6. A test.
We already mentioned that, as a result of hedonic adaptation or expectation-based prefer-
ences, there is a lot of evidence on adaptation to many sensations. A key prediction of the model
is that we should not nd much adaptation for sensations with defense and warning roles. First
of all, you should remember that we are not studying sensory habituation: it makes perfect
sense if we immerse our feet in cold water and feel no pain after a while. However, it makes no
sense to loss sensitivity to cold after living a couple of months in Siberia: the individual would
be able to "ignore" the weather and would eventually die from hypothermia.
It is a fact that fever, pain, and the main defense systems do not adapt: they would stop
being defenses if they were to adapt. And the same is true for warning systems: an alarm that
can be ignored is no longer an alarm. Since this is too obvious, scientists have not tried to test
this. However, we did nd some related studies.
Firstly, sound perception plays an important warning role: in our evolutionary history sounds
may alert either the presence of a predator or the presence of a pray. Weinstein (1982) inter-
viewed a panel of residents for four months and sixteen months after a highway was opened, and
found that there is no adaptation whatsoever to noise. Moreover, the conclusions are supported
by subsequent studies (see Weinstein, 1982).
The second example is about the human irritant sense, which is the chemical sensitivity of
the mucosae (e.g. ocular, nasal). For instance, people who lack the sense of smell (anosmic)
can detect airborne chemicals only through the irritant sense. This sense makes it impossible
21A standard counter-argument would say that people could simply anticipate adaptation at an unconscious
level, or through adaptive behavior.
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for the individual to remain in toxic environments, which is a clear defense role. As expected,
Cometto-Muniz et al. (1992) found very little adaptation to pungent, harmful chemicals.
Finally, we must mention that there are some studies arguing that chronic pain patients
exhibit higher than normal thresholds for various types of experimental pain (e.g. Meskey et
al., 1975). It is perfectly reasonable to expect mild adaptation to pain, since we were ultimately
built to adapt. Especially given that the injuries in those studies are chronic: intense sensations
are meant to elicit behavior (e.g. step out of the re), and if the situation is chronic that may
not be useful anymore.
However, the validity of the ndings is weak. As Dar et al. (1995) suggest, painful experiences
do not change the intensity of pain but the internal anchor points for the subjective evaluation
of pain. Peters et al. (1992) shows that even though chronic pain patients reported higher
tolerance to pain, they did not di¤er in objective measures such as nociceptive exion reex (a
measure of spinal nociceptive processes). Finally, the estimates are not reduced-form estimates
but simple mean comparisons, which can simply reect the mere fact that those who are less
afraid from injuries have on average more tolerance to pain.
Finally, our model provides a potential valuable tool for the measurement of hedonic adapta-
tion. Consider the case of inter-temporal comparisons (the same argument can be made about
inter-personal comparisons): i.e. we want to measure how subject A adapts to stimulus s from t
to t+1. Suppose an experimental design: you measure how much incremental pleasure the sub-
ject gets from a low stimulus s at t, then you increase the stimulus for some time and measure
the incremental pleasure at t+ 1.
Up to know there were two ways of measuring incremental pleasure: either varying the price
of the good, or self-reports (e.g. "how much did you like the stimulus?"). The problem with the
rst approach is that either income, income expectations, expenditure or planned expenditure
may change between t and t + 1. The second approach has a number of problems related to
self-reports, such as how peoples interpretation of the question may vary considerably over time.
According to our model, the sensations related to defense and warning systems are the ones
that should adapt the least. Then we can make people face trade-o¤s between the stimuli s
and some of the latter sensations (e.g. pain) to get a more consistent measure of incremental
pleasure. We can use the literature on adaptation to get the best candidates: e.g. nociceptive
exion reex or the irritant sense.
3. An application: Psychological Defenses
Each sensation has its own (relatively) independent adaptation mechanism, and habituation
may change dramatically from one sensation to another. For instance, we have not yet discussed
the timing of the hedonic adjustments: they could be gradual or prompt, partially or completely
automatic, and so on.
To illustrate the kind of characteristics that shape the dynamics of adaptation, in this section
we will provide an application to a particular class of sensations: psychological states (e.g. anger,
sadness). Psychologists have long recognized that hedonic states trigger processes to attenuate
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the physiological impact (e.g. Taylor, 1991), ranging from homeostatic processes (e.g. Sandvik
et al., 1985) to what they call defensive processes (e.g. Freud, 1937).
We have already noticed that the costs associated to sensations (stress, lack of concentration,
etc.) are convex. The other building block of the model is the fact that psychological processes
that attenuate distress may have costs (Lazarus, 1985; Richards et al., 2000; Wegner et al.,
1993), and thus they tend to be triggered only when distress passes a critical threshold. This is
known as the Region- Paradox (Gilbert et al., 2004). Intuitively, people trigger psychological
defenses when they face the death of a relative, but they do not trigger such defenses when their
favorite shirt gets stained. You can nd three experiments that illustrate this idea in Gilbert et
al. (2004).
To model this phenomenon we will use a model of dynamic optimization in continuous time.22
Assume that the hedonic state (H) follows an Ito process with slope  and variance : dH =
dt+ dz, where dz is a Wiener Process.23 The tness cost of sensations is convex in the level
of hedonic state: C   b2H2, where C represents the tness of an individual with a completely
neutral hedonic state, and b is a parameter that scales the tness cost of sensations (and its
convexity as well).
Nature can hard-wire an individual to make his hedonic state automatically jump up or down
when some pre-determined thresholds are reached: if Ai is the size of the adjustment i and hi is
the corresponding threshold, happiness will jump from hi to hi+Ai (if the jump is upwards) or
hi Ai (if it is downwards) as soon as the hedonic state reaches hi.24 There may be two tness
costs associated to such jumps: xed costs (Ci) and variable costs (ci), all of them non-negative,
where the index i 2 fU;Dg indicates that the costs can be di¤erent for upwards and downwards
jumps.
We already discussed that people tend to underestimate the power of a¤ective adaptation,
and thus they tend to overestimate the duration of their hedonic states (Gilbert et al., 1998). We
are assuming that people do not predict the bounce back in happiness due to the psychological
defenses: the path of happiness is independent from the design of the adjustment process.25
Denote A to the set of all possible adjustments. For every a 2 A, denote (n) to the date
of the nth adjustment, C(n) to the tness cost of the nth adjustment, and A(n) to the size of
nth adjustment. If a 2 A is the path of adjustments, then the resulting path of hedonic states
is Ht(a). The problem of Nature is the following:
22Widely used in economic modeling of, say, investment decisions by rms (Bertola et al., 1990).
23We could write a more elaborate model. For instance, a risky asset may be following an Ito Process, and
we can obtain the hedonic state as the result of the optimal inter-temporal consumption and asset allocation.
Nonetheless, the results would be about the same.
24This is known as Homeostasis: there are detectors that monitor when a system departs from set-points.
25This could not happen if the model is well-specied. Suppose that people know that if happiness goes down to
U then it automatically bounces back to u . Therefore, if someone is between u and U he would have to harm
himself as to fall down to U and bounce back to u. To our knowledge nobody has suggested that individuals
embrace such self-destructive enterprises to take advantage of the psychological defenses.
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(
CU + cUA(n) if A(n)  0
CD + cD jA(n)j if A(n) < 0
Where  is the discount rate. The solution to the model (see Appendix 2) is that Nature
hard-wires the following automatic adjustments: if the hedonic state goes down to U , then it is
adjusted up to u  U ; and if the hedonic state goes up to D, it is adjusted down to d  D .26
We can study how the adjustment mechanism changes when we modify the underlying pa-
rameters of the model. To begin with, higher hedonic volatility () makes it more likely that a
random change moves the hedonic process closer to zero, thereby increasing Natures willingness
to refrain from making an adjustment: U decreases and D increases. An increase in hedonic
growth () makes all U , u, D and d go down: the probability of hitting the upper (lower) bound
increases (decreases), and the thresholds change accordingly. If we increase the tness costs of
sensations (b) then more frequent and bigger adjustments will be desired, so U and u decreases
while D and d increases.
If there are no variable costs of adjustment then, conditionally on making an adjustment,
Nature would always seek to adjust to the same point: that is to say u = d if cU = cD = 0 (and
particularly u = d = 0 if  = 0). If there are no xed costs for adjustments, then Nature will
make an innitesimal adjustment when the marginal cost of an adjustment falls just below the
expected loss from a marginal change in H : that is, u = U and d = D if CU = CD = 0.
It can be quite di¢ cult to gure out the composition of the tness costs of a particular
psychological defense. Consider two usual examples: fantasy and denial. On the one hand,
fantasy has a relatively larger xed cost: the organism need time and energy to generate the
fantasies in our head, regardless of whether the illusion is meant to rationalize the death of a
relative or the death of a pet.
Denial on the other hand doesnt seem to have a xed cost. Yet the variable cost is certainly
nonzero: denying that raspberries are delicious is from a tness point of view much less dangerous
than, say, denying the law of gravity. Thus, in the case of negative experiences, we should expect
fantasy (relatively to denial) to have a lower threshold but trigger greater jumps.27
4. Conclusions
Many characteristics of our pleasure and pain systems can tell us a lot about our biological
design once we see them as a result of evolution. For instance, we wondered why Nature did not
give us a system of stochastic rewards, and the reason why we have a multiplicity of sensations.
26Graham et al. (2006) proposed a model where people smoothbad life-shocks by the drawing down of what
they call hedonic capital. This would be in some sense a supplement to what Nature tries to do automatically.
27In fact the hedonic state is multidimensional, and then there are di¤erent psychological defenses with di¤erent
adjustment costs and therefore Nature triggers di¤erent psychological defenses dened all over the hedonic
space.
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Nature is a principal much smarter than some of her agents tend to believe. After taking into
consideration two simple biological facts, we showed that Nature must use utility functions with
regulation mechanisms such as hedonic adaptation or expectation-based preferences. Far from
being a novelty, both mechanisms are part of the mainstream in psychology and neuroscience.
Incorporating them into economic models will increase the number of behavioral phenomena
that we are able to explain, and furthermore it will provide more accurate welfare predictions.
Even though the theory of hedonic adaptation may seem nihilistic at rst glance, there is a
romantic interpretation: Nature gave us a life of constant challenges. And even if since times of
the hunter-gatherer mankind has been running on the never-ending hedonic treadmill, we may
possibly reach a status of enlightenment such as to perpetuate happiness, or even more, put the
treadmill in reverse.
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Appendix 1.
The question is whether Nature could have hard-wired us in such a way that it is di¢ cult for
us to outsmart the system. First notice that the greater  the less the di¤erences in behavior
between naïve and sophisticate introduced by  > 0. Nature could have used more complex
adaptation rules. For example, current utility may be negatively a¤ected by the mean utility
during the last N periods: U(ct)   1N
PN
s=1 U(ct s). Starting at period N we get the original
problem with n = 1 and s = 1   1  1+
N
N . The distortion brought by sophisticate agents
decreases rapidly as we increase N . Intuitively, the impact of current consumption on future
adaptation is "smoothed" over N periods. Notice that we would get the same result by using
as a benchmark the utility from N periods ago. However, in both cases the results are limited
during the rst I < N periods (since we do not have enough "history").
Nature could have completely eliminated the distortions in a rather simple way: by multiply-
ing the U() of the sophisticate by 1=s, in which case the problems of both types become the
same. This solution is impossible if  = 1 , but even if  is not one but close to one it is still
problematic: we would have a utility function for the sophisticate with asymptotic mean zero,
but extremely "steep." Since sensations have convex tness costs, Nature will face restrictions
to take advantage of this particular solution.
To study this more deeply we need a richer lifetime model. If the individuals consumption
converges to a xed number, then in the long run they will be no cost from scaling the utility
function. But if consumption jumps a lot (e.g. there are credit constrains and stochastic income),
then scaling is costly and we should solve a trade-o¤ between mean and variance.
Finally, it would be interesting to consider a model where people learnabout  over time,
while they cognitively process past information on stimuli and hedonic responses. We should
expect t to be increasing in t. But individuals would be naïve about future selves: at time t
people should act as if s = t 8s  t. That is to say, this version of hedonic adaptation would
bring dynamically inconsistent preferences.
There is vast evidence on imperfect a¤ective forecasting beyond the particular case of hedonic
adaptation (for an extensive review see Loewenstein et al., 1999, 2003). In the last three million
years the human brain tripled in size, mainly because the growth of the frontal lobe and its
prefrontal cortex. One of the core roles of this structure is the ability to make predictions
(Banyas, 1999). If Nature gave us a "simulator" capable of predictions beyond the computational
power of the most advanced super-computers, there must be a reason why we cannot forecast the
simplest hedonic experiences. Hedonic adaptation may provide an explanation for this puzzle:
thanks to imperfect a¤ective forecasting, Nature can prevent us from "outsmarting" the system.
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